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The Global Economic Crisis: 
Long-Term Unemployment in the OECD
* 
 
This paper analyses the impact of the global economic crisis on unemployment and long term 
unemployment in the OECD. It uses simple econometric models using panel data (quarterly) 
and time series data. In general, we find that long term unemployment increases with the 
unemployment rate, there is persistence in long term unemployment, and that the 
employment protection variable and the replacement rate are statistically insignificant. 
Overall, the findings of our research are that there are many differences between the impact 
of the Great Recession on different countries. Countries that faced a significant financial 
crisis and a collapse of the housing market bubble have had large increases in 
unemployment and long term unemployment. There was a big fall in employment in the 
(especially) construction and manufacturing industries. The financial collapse led to an 
increase in unemployment in the financial and business sector. As a result of these twin 
shocks labour mobility of the unemployed is likely to be affected: with negative equity in 
housing, unemployed workers are unlikely to move regionally. With a loss of wealth (in 
housing and financial assets, including superannuation) there will be a fall in consumer 
spending which will slow down the recovery of economies. This means that, especially for 
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The Global Economic Crisis: Long Term Unemployment in the OECD
1
1.  Introduction 
 
P.N. (Raja) Junankar 
A prolonged period of unprecedented growth in most OECD economies since the middle of 
the 1990s (except for a temporary crisis in 2001), was  ended  suddenly  by  the Global 
Financial Crisis (GFC) and its aftermath. The “Great Recession” that followed has been the 
most severe recession in recent  years.  In some countries, especially the USA, the UK, 
Ireland, and Spain, the combination of a financial crisis with the bursting of the housing 
bubble dealt a severe blow to their economies. Even though many countries are now slowly 
coming out of the recession with modest growth in GDP, it will be some time before 
unemployment rates will fall substantially. Although many countries have survived the 
Global Financial Crisis (GFC), some countries in the Eurozone are apparently teetering on 
the brink of financial breakdown as a result of the debt crisis: after the Greek crisis and the 
Irish bailout, there  have been  rumours of the imminent collapse of Portugal, Spain, and 
perhaps Italy.  At present, even Italy and France have had their ratings downgraded by 
Moodies. All this uncertainty leads to a cautious response by firms about investment in new 
capital goods: investment in real capital remains stagnant. In addition, the sudden fall in 
wealth of many consumers due to a fall in house prices and in equity prices has slowed the 
growth in consumer expenditure. Further, the financial crisis has led to a tightening of credit 
by financial institutions to firms. These factors are likely to slow down the recovery from the 
Great Recession. The impact of the recession has been unevenly distributed across the 
OECD: some countries like Australia officially did not have a recession (GDP growth was 
negative for only one quarter), while other countries like Germany bounced back very 
quickly. 
In the wake of the Great Recession we have seen a crisis in the labour markets of many 
countries, with escalating unemployment rates and consequently a growth in long term 
unemployment. The number of unemployed persons in the OECD went up from 30.6 million 
in 2007 (Q4) to 47 million in 2010 (Q2), while the long term unemployed went up from 8.5 
                                                            
1 I am grateful to Robert Wells and Jenny Wong for excellent research assistance with the econometric 
analyses. Extensive comments by Paul Swaim, OECD, on an earlier draft have made a significant improvement 
and I thank him for his help. Comments by Cezary Kapuscinski, Department of Education, Employment and 
Workplace Relations, Commonwealth of Australia, and by Professor Geoff Harcourt, University of New South 
Wales are gratefully acknowledged. I am, of course, responsible for remaining errors and for views expressed. 4 
 
million to 14.9 million. The growth of unemployment and long term unemployment has 
serious economic, social, and human costs. Past history suggests that once the unemployment 
rate increases it takes a very long time for it to return to the pre-recession levels: often times 
economies are hit by another recession before that happens. Long term unemployment 
increases, after a lag, with the increases in unemployment, and also takes a very long time 
before it comes down to previous levels. 
Many OECD countries had introduced labour market reforms that increased the use of 
casual/temporary workers and decreased the strictness of employment protection legislation. 
As such in the Great Recession, many more workers faced unemployment as temporary 
workers contracts were not renewed or they were laid off. 
The Great Recession had led most countries to introduce crisis measures to tackle 
unemployment: monetary policy was suddenly relaxed with central banks lowering interest 
rates to almost zero, increasing money supply (quantitative easing); and expansionary fiscal 
policies were introduced. It is generally accepted by many economists, and leading 
international organisations (e.g. the OECD and the IMF), that the crisis measures introduced 
(both monetary and fiscal) helped to attenuate the fall in GDP and rise in unemployment. 
However, after a short period many Governments were no longer willing to continue the 
crisis measures of expansionary fiscal policies, and began to cut back on government 
expenditures and began to worry more about government budget deficits rather than the state 
of the labour market. 
This paper provides an analysis of long term unemployment in the OECD during the Great 
Recession and in the early recovery period. The paper argues that the growth of long term 
unemployment is a necessary consequence of the growth of unemployment rate. Although 
most OECD countries had an increase in unemployment rates, a few managed to turn around 
the economies and to lower unemployment rates. These economies, Australia and Germany 
being good examples, had a relatively small increase in long term unemployment which 
began to come down relatively quickly. Other economies, in particular the USA, Spain, and 
Ireland,  had a massive increase in unemployment rates and consequently in long term 
unemployment. Even though the unemployment rates are now beginning to come down, the 
long term unemployment rates are still rising. A comparison of the growth of long term 
unemployment during this so-called Great Recession with previous recessions shows that 5 
 
some countries performed worse in this recession: the USA has had a historic rise in 
unemployment (in about thirty years) and a massive increase in long term unemployment. 
Unemployment is a very unjust and undemocratic punishment. It hits disadvantaged groups 
in society: the young, the unskilled, ethnic minorities (the blacks in USA, indigenous 
Australians, etc.) and migrants. The long term unemployed are not only a wasted resource, 
they are also a wasting resource. The long term unemployed not only lose their skills, they 
lose motivation, they fall ill: in crude economic terms human capital is being depreciated. In 
human terms there is a mass of misery and suffering: often they live in poverty, they have lost 
their self respect and dignity and they accept the verdict of the labour market with a mixture 
of resentment and resignation. The social implications of this are very serious: some people 
argue it leads to increased social strife,  growth of right wing extremist parties, anti-
immigration campaigns, riots, divorce and family breakdowns, illness, and death, see 
Aaronson et al. (2010), Dao and Loungani (2010), Junankar (1986,  1987), Junankar and 
Kapuscinski (1991), Saunders and Taylor (2002). In this context it is important that OECD 
countries engage in a “war” on long term unemployment! 
2.  Unemployment and Long Term Unemployment: An Analytical Framework 
Some Conceptual Issues 
There are often two data series for unemployment available: Labour Force Sample Surveys 
(based on the International Labour Organisation, ILO, conventions) and the administrative 
data on Unemployment Benefit Recipients. According to ILO conventions, to be unemployed 
a person must not have been working for pay or profit for one hour or more in the last week, 
must be looking for work in the past four weeks, and must be available to start work in the 
following week. From an economist’s perspective, it is important to note that the survey does 
not mention at what wage they wish to find work. The ILO series are based on sample 
surveys and are subject to sampling variability.  In addition the data are subject to recall 
errors and to respondent error. The administrative data are based on a complete count of the 
unemployment benefit recipients and hence are not subject to sampling error. However, if a 
person moves from unemployment benefits to sickness benefits and then returns to 
unemployment the person is counted as having a “zero” duration, while s/he may think of it is 
as a continuous spell of unemployment. Another problem with using this administrative data 
to compare changes in unemployment over time is that conditions for accessing 
unemployment benefits change and hence there is no consistency in the time series data. 6 
 
Following a common convention, a person is deemed to be in long term unemployment in 
this paper if s/he has been unemployed continuously for 12 months or longer. However, the 
strict definitions of unemployment and long term unemployment generally provide a lower 
bound estimates of the true extent of involuntary joblessness and underemployment: some of 
the unemployed workers give up searching for work (discouraged workers), others 
(especially the young) may decide to move into educational institutions (“encouraged 
students”), and some who work part time would prefer to work longer hours but are unable to 
obtain work.  
Similarly, the long term unemployed numbers are likely to be underestimates because if a 
person who was unemployed finds temporary (casual) work for a week or so, s/he typically 
would be reported as beginning a new spell of unemployment and hence be removed from the 
list of long term unemployed. If a person enters a brief labour market program (say a training 
program) s/he is also likely to be removed from the list of the unemployed and would begin a 
new spell of unemployment. If an unemployed person falls ill for a short period, s/he also 
tends to return to the unemployed stock with a new spell (in effect is “re-born” with a zero 
duration). The long term unemployed are also more likely to fall ill, and hence have their 
unemployment spell broken. Some workers have many recurrent spells of unemployment that 
if added up over a few years would in fact constitute long term unemployment (interrupted by 
short spells of work or inactivity), see OECD (2002). 
Measures of long term unemployed are measures of so-called “interrupted spells”: a person 
may be unemployed for only 11 months at present, but will remain unemployed for another 2 
months but is at present not a long term unemployed person. During the early stages of a 
recession there may be many unemployed persons who, although unemployed for less than 
12 months, would eventually remain unemployed for 12 months or more  (this leads to 
“interruption bias”). A counter-weight to this is that due to the sampling procedures there is a 
greater probability that a long term unemployed person would be in the sample (“length 
bias”). 
We define the numbers in long term unemployment (the unemployed with durations of 
twelve months or longer) as NLTU. 
A measure of long term unemployment that is commonly used is the incidence of long-term 
unemployment.  This is  the  proportion of unemployed persons who are long-term 7 
 
unemployed.  In this paper we use the term Proportion  of Long Term Unemployment 
(PLTU) for this concept. 
Sometimes an alternative measure is used called the long-term unemployment rate or the 
rate of long term unemployment (RLTU)  which  is  defined as the number of long-term 
unemployed in any group expressed as a percentage of the labour force in that same group. In 
a recession, the numbers in long term unemployment  (NLTU)  increase, but initially the 
proportion of long term unemployment (PLTU) falls. After the recession continues for some 
time, PLTU increases. In general, the proportion of long term unemployment (PLTU) and the 
rate of long term unemployment (RLTU) move in a similar fashion, except when the labour 
force changes substantially. A comparison was made for a few countries, and there was a 
very high correlation between the PLTU and RLTU measures. 
There is no obvious way of showing that any one of these metrics, NLTU, PLTU, or RLTU is 
a superior measure of long term unemployment. Which method is used depends on the 
question at hand. If we are interested in the increase in human suffering (misery) of the 
unemployed, we could use an increase in NLTU as reflecting how many more people are 
suffering from long term unemployment. However, the larger the population, the larger the 
numbers of unemployed for any given unemployment rate and hence the larger the number of 
long term unemployed, ceteris paribus. In population theory, we often use the concept of the 
dependency ratio (the percentage of people over retiring age plus the school aged children as 
a proportion of the total population). This normalisation is very common in population 
studies. Similarly, in studies of long term unemployment it is common to normalise the 
numbers of long term unemployed by the total numbers of unemployed people (measured as 
a percentage (PLTU). An alternative normalisation is to take the numbers of long term 
unemployed as a proportion of the labour force (RLTU). Given that the labour force is much 
larger than the total numbers unemployed RLTU is much smaller that PLTU and we would 
have to calculate RLTU to many more decimal places to be able to notice any change. In 
general, the labour force does not change very much in the short run, so that it is almost a 
constant, see Figure 5. Hence changes in NLTU would be reflected in changes in RLTU. 
If we are comparing changes over time of these measures of long term unemployment, we 
could use the percentage increase over a period of time of NLTU, PLTU, or RLTU. 
Alternatively, we could use the percentage  point increase in PLTU or RLTU. If we are 8 
 
concerned about the long term unemployed then a five percentage point increase when PLTU 
is five percent is not as serious as a five percentage point increase when PLTU is fifty 
percent. In the subsequent discussion we will provide some alternative metrics for long term 
unemployment. 
 
Figure 1: Unemployment: Stock and Flows 
 
 
Usual measures of unemployment are measures of the stock of unemployment at a point in 
time. The labour market is in a continual state of flux with large movements between 
different labour market states. Changes in this stock of unemployment come about by inflows 
into the stock and outflows from the stock. The inflows (those joining the unemployment 
stock) may have come from employment, not-in-the-labour force (NILF), or new entrants 
(some from educational establishments). The outflows from unemployment may find work, 
leave the labour force (retire early fall, sick, or give up hope, i.e. join the NILF), or go into 
labour market programs, e.g. training schemes, see Figure 1. In simple form: 9 
 
      Ut = Ut-1 + It - Xt      (1) 
where the U's are unemployment stocks at the end of periods, and I denotes inflows into the 
unemployment stock and X denotes outflows (X for exits) from the unemployment stock (the 
flows are measured over the period)
2
Inflows (It) = Quits + Fires + New Entrants 
. 
Outflows (Xt) = New Hires + Retires, Deaths + New participants in Labour Market 
Programs. 
In this format we can consider equilibrium as one where the inflows into unemployment just 
equal the outflows out of unemployment, that is, when the unemployment rate remains 
constant. Note, however, that this “equilibrium” unemployment rate is not unique and has no 
welfare significance. 
It is useful to consider an analogy to demographic analysis: a stationary population has 
Unemployment constant, but a stable population has Unemployment constant and  the 
duration distribution is constant. In a recession, unemployment inflows increase and 
unemployment outflows fall significantly. As such, the first impact of a recession could be a 
fall in the proportion of long term unemployment, but it subsequently increases provided the 
outflow rate remains constant or falls. Note that data on unemployment durations are for 
interrupted spells, hence we would expect that after the start of a recession the long durations 
would continue to increase. In demographic theory it has been shown that an increase in the 
birth rates (assuming the age specific mortality rates are unchanged) leads to a fall in the 
average age of the population. If the mortality rates fall (rise), ceteris paribus, then the 
average age of the population would gradually increase (decrease) until it reaches its new 
equilibrium level. Analogously, if there is an increase in the inflows into unemployment (and 
no change in the duration specific exit probabilities) then the average duration would fall, 
and an increase in the unemployment rate. If there was a fall (rise) in the exit probabilities 
but no change in the inflow rate, then there would be a permanent increase (decrease) in the 
average duration and the unemployment rate would also rise (decline). Machin and Manning 
                                                            
2  Note that in the literature on capital and investment, economists almost always try to estimate models of 
investment (the addition to capital stock, a flow) and not the level of the capital stock. However, for some 
reason, economists usually estimate equations for the stock of unemployment, partly because flow data are 
not easily available. 10 
 
(1998) have shown that a fall in the exit probabilities for any duration group leads to an 
increase in unemployment and hence an increase in long term unemployment.  
The situation is somewhat different in a recession, since inflows and outflows deviate only 
temporarily from their prior values. In a typical recession, the inflows into unemployment 
increase for a short while, and then go back to their previous levels. At the same time, the exit 
probabilities fall and continue at low levels for a longer period of time. As such, we would 
expect the percentage of long term unemployment to fall temporarily before increasing 
subsequently for a few years. What we have learned from past recessions is that it sometimes 
takes a very long time for the unemployment rate to return to its pre-recession levels, see 
OECD (2009, pp. 36-38). Similarly, as the recession takes hold, long term unemployment 
increases and it can take an even longer time for long term unemployment to return to pre-
recession levels: sometimes the economies never return to previous levels before they are hit 
by another recession. Hence, the lesson we have to learn is to either prevent a recession 
(which is very difficult or impossible) or, perhaps more realistically, to prevent the recession 
from becoming too severe or lasting for too long. That requires not only appropriate (and 
timely) monetary and fiscal policies but also active labour market policies to help the long 
term unemployed to re-integrate into the labour market. 
A Schematic Presentation 
Here is a stylised account of a sequence of moves in a labour market responding to a sudden 
fall in aggregate demand for output (the actual response would also depend on whether the 
fall in demand is expected to be temporary or permanent):  
(a) Firms stop new hires (outflows from unemployment fall). Since firms stop hiring 
workers, new entrants into the labour market are unable to find work and join the 
unemployment queue: inflows into unemployment increase. 
(b) Firms cut back on over-time, and put workers on short time working (cut working 
hours) 
(c) Casual workers are laid off (inflows into unemployment increase) 
(d) Contract workers contracts are not renewed (inflows into unemployment increase) 
(e) Permanent workers are laid off (inflows into unemployment increase) 
(f)  As hiring has stopped (or reduced dramatically) outflows fall and remain low for a 
long time, until demand for goods and services begins to increase. 11 
 
(g) As demand for goods and services pick up, firms increase the working hours of 
existing workers (no change in outflows) 
(h) Firms increase over-time work (no change in outflows). 
(i)  Firms increase casual and contract workers (outflows increase). 
(j)  Firms, when demand has risen (and is expected to remain high) begin hiring new 
permanent workers, (outflows increase). 
These are the moves of larger firms. Small firms are likely to move through items (a) through 
(d) very rapidly. Firms that become bankrupt due to a crisis would simply have to do all the 
items, (a) through (e) simultaneously. 
In Figure 2, we show a stylised version of the inflows into unemployment and outflows from 
unemployment. As the recession hits at time t0, the increase inflows and decrease in outflows 
would lead to an increase in unemployment. As the inflows return to a previous equilibrium 
level and outflows begin to increase, unemployment would continue to increase. Even after 
time t1, if outflows reach the same level as inflows unemployment would continue to increase 
for some time before returning to its original equilibrium level. 
Figure 2: Response of Inflows and Outflows to a Demand Shock 
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Thus the impact on the numbers employed is usually lagged behind a fall in demand by 
between six and twelve months. Usually, the employer would wait-and-see if the fall in 
demand is more than a temporary fall because the employer does not wish to lose the skilled 
and loyal staff s/he has been employing for some time. 
The impact of the increase in inflows into unemployment is to decrease the probability of 
each of the unemployed from finding work (even if the level of demand for labour went back 
to its previous levels): for each job vacancy there are more potential applicants. As a result, 
some of the unemployed will now be unemployed for a longer duration: those previously 
unemployed for less than a month will now move onto the next group of one to three months 
duration, and like a pack of dominoes falling there will be more unemployed workers shifted 
onto the next duration level, etc. A generally accepted definition of long term unemployment 
is one where a worker has a continuous period of unemployment of 12 months or longer. In 
the USA, their definition of long term unemployment is for workers of 6 months or longer of 
unemployment duration
3
(a) Job vacancies for particular kinds of workers: with particular levels of education, 
skills, experience, occupation, and geographical location. Many statistical agencies 
report vacancy rates: numbers of vacancies advertised by employers. However, unless 
there are data of vacancies by skill levels etc, the aggregate series is not very useful. 
.  
Whether a person leaves the unemployment stock or the long term unemployment stock 
depends on the following: 
(b) Given there are vacancies, do the unemployed workers discover these vacancies? That 
depends to some extent on the search strategies (process) followed by the unemployed 
workers. The search intensity (how often a worker looks for work) and efficiency of 
job search would influence the unemployed finding a vacancy. 
(c) Given that a worker finds a vacancy and meets an employer, whether the “match” is 
successful depends on the vector of characteristics the employer seeks and the 
characteristics of the applicant. There is some evidence to suggest that employers use 
the duration of unemployment of the applicant as a signal of the quality of the worker. 
                                                            
3 In the USA, unemployment benefits were usually limited to six months. However, in the Great Recession 
unemployment benefits have been extended to up to 18 months. The maximum duration climbed to 99 weeks in 
early 2009 and will remain at that level until at least the end of 2011. 13 
 
Hence, those who have been unemployed for long periods find it increasingly difficult 
to find work. 
(d) If the job applicant receives a job offer, noting that during a period of high 
unemployment that there are many applicants for each vacancy, whether s/he accepts 
the offer depends not only on the wage offer (relative to the reservation wage of the 
unemployed job searcher), but also on other conditions of employment affecting the 
quality of job offered. The reservation wage would be influenced by the “generosity” 
(and duration) of unemployment benefits. A factor that would have been especially 
important in the Great Recession would also be the amount of accumulated savings 
that the unemployed person has, as well as the level of mortgage payments and other 
personal debts
4
(e) Although it is often argued that the generosity (and duration) of unemployment 
benefits leads to workers refusing job offers and hence leading to higher levels of 
unemployment and long term unemployment, it should be noted that from a societal 
. The Global Financial Crisis and the bursting of the housing price 
bubble meant that many people who had their assets tied up in stock market equity 
and/or housing would suddenly have become poorer. In the USA, many home owners 
with substantial mortgages would presumably accept almost any job, if it were 
available. The quality of a job that an unemployed person would accept would also 
depend on their age and experience: a person who had worked in senior positions for 
a long time would be unlikely to accept a job at a lower occupational level. For 
example, if a Wall Street Banker was offered a clerical position s/he is unlikely to 
accept the position. Often most of the vacancies that are available are for people with 
reasonable levels of education and skills, while many of the unemployed are those 
with low levels of education and unskilled workers. In general, the longer the worker 
has been unemployed, the lower his or her expectations about the wage they would 
accept and/or the quality of job that they would accept. Similarly, in a major recession 
the unemployed workers would have low expectations of getting many wage offers 
and are likely to have a very low reservation wage or reservation quality. Again there 
is evidence to suggest that unemployed workers who eventually find work accept 
significantly lower wages, see Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993), Couch and 
Placzek (2010). 
                                                            
4  It would be interesting to carry out research to see if the value of personal assets and debts influence exit 
probabilities of the unemployed. 14 
 
point of view an unemployed person who accepts a lower quality job (that is a job that 
requires less education, skills, or experience than the worker has) means a “poor 
match” and hence is not socially efficient. In a paper by Mark Stewart (2007) using 
longitudinal data from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), he finds that a 
low wage job has as large adverse effect as unemployment on future prospects. 
Evidence provided in Butterworth et al. (2011) shows that the mental health of an 
unemployed person who moves to a job with poor “psychosocial” quality worsens. 
Hence, labour market policies that encourage an unemployed person to accept any job 
is likely to lead to a decrease in the welfare of the unemployed, as well as societal 
welfare. 
(f)  However, from an aggregative point of view, unemployment benefits act as an 
automatic stabiliser and hence increase aggregate demand and hence the probability 
of job offers. 
The long  term unemployed usually have a lower exit probability  compared to other job 
seekers for one of two reasons: firstly, the employers often treat unemployment duration as a 
negative signal
5
3.  The Great Recession: Unemployment and Long Term Unemployment 
  (they must be hopeless, that is why they are long term unemployed); 
secondly, the long term unemployed lose their skills (skill atrophy/human capital 
depreciation), become dejected and drop out of the labour market. 
There is a well known analogy for the long term unemployed: it is the Flower shop analogy, 
customers buy the freshest flowers, and the wilted flowers are left in the shop. When new 
flowers arrive, the old flowers look even worse the next day. Employers hire the newly 
unemployed workers, and the long term unemployed remain in the unemployed stock. When 
a new inflow of unemployed workers enter the stock, the long term unemployed are pushed 
to the end of the queue. Thus the long term unemployed have lower and lower probabilities 
of finding employment. 
In this section we present evidence on the growth of unemployment and long term 
unemployment in the Great Recession. As mentioned in the introduction, unemployment in 
                                                            
5 A New York Times article headed “The Unemployed Need Not Apply” (February 19, 2011) reports that at a 
forum of the Equal Opportunities Commission several people mentioned that employers were not willing to 
consider unemployed applicants and that it discriminated against (especially) African Americans who 
constitute a large proportion of the unemployed. Similarly, a report in Management Today (21
st February 
2011) says that a survey by Barclays Corporate and the Financial Times that 57 % of employers are not willing 
to consider ex-civil servants. 15 
 
the OECD went up from 30.6 million to 47 million from 2007 Q4 to 2010 Q2, while long 
term unemployed persons went up from 8.5 million to 14.9 million, Table 1 and Figure 3. Or 
looking at the percentage increases, there was an increase of 53.8 percent in the numbers 
unemployed and a 75.8 percent increase in the long term unemployed. This Table shows that 
even in aggregate, that at the onset of the recession as unemployment increases that the 
percentage of long term unemployment first decreases (due to the increase in inflows with 
short durations), but after some time the percentage of long term unemployment increases (as 
the outflows from unemployment fall due to a fall in exit probabilities). For this aggregate 
level OECD data, it appears that there is actually a fall in the numbers of long term 
unemployed (NLTU) which is perhaps due to country wide differences (e.g. in Germany 
unemployment and long term unemployment were falling). The numbers of long term 
unemployed (NLTU) appear to lag behind the increase in unemployed numbers by about 
three quarters. However, the Proportion of Long Term Unemployment (PLTU) first falls and 
then after about 6 quarters starts increasing. These are simply average relationships that will 
be discussed in more detail when we turn to the heterogeneity in response for different 
countries during the Great Recession. This massive growth of unemployment and long term 
unemployment was very unevenly distributed across the OECD countries. For the G7 
countries, the increase was a “modest” increase of 80.3 percent over the same period. 
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(000s)  PLTU (%) 
2007.75  30600.16257  8507.74779  27.8 
2008  32308.37721  8359.65363  25.9 
2008.25  32462.27471  8214.99698  25.3 
2008.5  33238.14933  8022.37502  24.1 
2008.75  36587.03358  8660.95554  23.7 
2009  44407.14378  9511.84374  21.4 
2009.25  46479.92846  10390.00102  22.4 
2009.5  46683.41369  11435.76552  24.5 
2009.75  46542.97212  12691.31663  27.3 
2010  49809.08832  14726.26313  29.6 
2010.25  47262.65189  14984.66126  31.7 
2010.5  40011.72493  13688.74387  34.2 
Increase 2007 
Q4 to 2010 Q3  9411.56236  5180.99608  6.4 
% Increase 
2007 Q4 to 
2010 Q3  30.8  60.9  23.1 
Source: OECD Unemployment duration by gender and age groups_New.xls 
   17 
 
Figure 3: OECD Unemployment, Long Term Unemployment (NLTU), and Proportion 
of LTU (PLTU) 
 
Source: OECD Unemployment duration by gender and age groups_New.xls 
Table 2 shows that the growth of unemployment in the OECD was also unevenly distributed, 
with Ireland, Spain, and the USA leading with the highest increases in the unemployment 
rate. In many countries in the OECD unemployment did not rise as much as in previous 
recessions because of the decreases in average hours worked, with some countries using short 
time working schemes, e.g. Germany (kurzarbeit scheme), Japan and Canada
6
                                                            
6 See OECD(2010b) Working Paper No. 756 
. Since in 
previous years growth had been strong, firms wished to retain their skilled labour. 






















Table 2: Unemployment Rates in the Great Recession 
  
Increase in UR 
% points   % Increase in UR, 2007 Q4-2010 Q2 
AUS UR  0.8  18.2 
AUT UR  0.5  12.2 
BEL UR  1.3  18.1 
CAN 
UR  2.1  35.6 
CZE UR  2.4  49.0 
DEU UR  -1.1  -13.8 
DNK 
UR  3.9  114.7 
ESP UR  11.4  132.6 
FIN UR  1.9  28.8 
FRA UR  2  25.3 
GBR UR  2.7  52.9 
GRC UR  4.2  52.5 
HUN 
UR  3.4  43.0 
IRL UR  8.7  181.3 
ITA UR  2.1  33.3 
JPN UR  1.3  33.3 
MEX 
UR  1.8  48.6 
NLD UR  1.2  36.4 
NOR 
UR  1.1  44.0 
NZL UR  3.4  97.1 
POL UR  1  11.6 
PRT UR  3.1  39.2 
SVK UR  3.7  34.6 
SVN UR  2.6  55.3 
SWE 
UR  2.6  43.3 
TUR UR  1.5  16.5 
USA UR  4.9  102.1 
Source: OECD Harmonised Unemployment Rates 
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Figure 4: Unemployment Rates in the G7 
 
 
As Figure 4 shows unemployment rates in all the G7 countries were rising, except for 
Germany, and this is reflected in the increases in the percentage of long term unemployment 
in the G7 countries (except for Germany). A simple correlation between the percentage 
increase in unemployment rates and the percentage increase in the PLTU is 0.82 (over this 
period). Of course, if we looked at the first few quarters of the recession, we would probably 
have a lower and negative correlation. 
During a recession, as discussed earlier, labour force participation rates are likely to fall as 
people give up looking for work as their experience of rejections of applications increase 
(discouraged worker hypothesis). On the other hand, during a recession more people may join 
the labour force to compensate for the loss of work by a family member (added worker 
hypothesis). As we see in Figure 5, the Labour Force Participation Rates may then rise or fall 
depending on these two offsetting forces. In the Great Recession, Labour Force Participation 
Rates went down marginally in Canada, Italy, Japan, New Zealand and the USA (USA had 
the largest fall of 1.06 percentage points), and went up or remained constant in the other 
countries. 20 
 
In the Great Recession, Employment Rates (see Figure 6)  went down  in all the above 
countries, except in Germany where they went up. The biggest fall was in Spain followed by 
the USA. This reflects the increases in unemployment and fall in labour force participation 
rates. 
Figure 5: Labour Force Participation Rates in 2007 Recession 
 
Source: OECD Quarterly Labour Force Statistics 
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Figure 6: Employment Rates in 2007 Recession 
 




Table 3: The Growth in Long Term Unemployment in OECD Countries 















AUS  67.4  4.5  31.6 
AUT  7.4  -1.3  -5.2 
BEL  18.6  -3.0  -5.8 
CAN  139.6  4.0  53.1 
CZE  31.1  -5.6  -11.4 
DEU  -32.0  -9.6  -16.9 
DNK  227.2  5.8  39.9 
ESP  357.9  18.0  93.0 
EST  307.8  4.1  8.4 
FIN  51.1  5.4  24.5 
FRA  32.7  3.4  9.0 
GBR  115.0  8.0  32.6 
GRC  46.5  -3.3  -6.6 
HUN  67.3  7.9  17.8 
IRL  408.9  21.5  76.6 
ISL  935.3  13.3  207.1 
ITA  24.1  4.6  10.2 
JPN  -100.0  -34.5  -100.0 
LUX  10.8  -0.1  -0.4 
MEX  -100.0  -1.2  -100.0 
NLD  9.1  -10.9  -28.4 
NOR  105.2  4.2  24.8 
NZL  221.9  2.9  68.8 
POL  -25.1  -16.2  -33.3 
PRT  57.9  6.5  13.9 
SVK  21.9  -8.5  -11.4 
SVN  67.3  4.8  11.6 
SWE  87.4  3.9  27.0 
TUR  35.1  1.7  6.9 
USA  532.8  20.9  234.8 
 
Source: OECD Unemployment duration by gender and age groups_New.xls 23 
 
 
Table 3 shows the growth in long term unemployment for the different countries of the 
OECD during the Great Recession. Table 4 shows that the countries hit hardest in the OECD 
(in terms of the percentage increase in the numbers of long term unemployed, NLTU) were 
the Iceland, USA, and Ireland. In terms of the percentage point increase in the proportion of 
long term unemployed, the countries that were hardest hit were Ireland, the USA, and Spain. 
In terms of the percentage increase in the Proportion of Long Term Unemployment (PLTU), 
the hardest hit were the USA, Iceland and Spain. Although the USA has had a very large 
increase in long term unemployment, the proportion of long term unemployment in the USA 
is just beginning to reach the levels common in European countries. A simple correlation 
between the percentage increase in unemployment rate and the percentage increase in the 
proportion of long term unemployment is 0.67. 
Table 4: Increases in Long Term Unemployment-The Top Five Countries  
Percentage 
Increase in NLTU, 
2007 Q4-2010 Q3 
Percentage Point 
Increase in PLTU, 
2007 Q4-2010 Q3 
Percentage 
Increase in PLTU, 
2007 Q4-2010 Q3 
ISL  IRL  USA 
USA  USA  ISL 
IRL  ESP  ESP 
ESP  ISL  IRL 
EST  GBR  NZL 
Source: OECD Unemployment duration by gender and age groups_New.xls 
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Figure 7: Long Term Unemployed Persons, NLTU (000s) in the G7 Great Recession, 
2007 Q4 to 2010 Q2 (Q3)) 
 
Source: OECD Unemployment duration by gender and age groups_New.xls 
Note: USA data (000s) are presented on the right hand scale. 
 
As mentioned earlier, there is a great variety of experience of long term unemployment in the 
OECD. If we focus on the G7 countries, Figure 7 clearly shows that the numbers in long term 
unemployment (NLTU) increased for most of the G7 with a striking increase for the USA, 
but an almost continuous fall in the case of Germany.  
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Figure 8: Proportion of Long Term Unemployment in total unemployment, the G7 
countries, Great Recession, 2007 Q4 to 2010 Q2 (Q3) 
 
Source: OECD Unemployment duration by gender and age groups_New.xls 
Figure 8 shows that the proportion of long term unemployment (PLTU) first falls during a 
recession  (as  increased  inflows into unemployment generate a rapid increase in newly 
unemployed workers) and then grows larger as the recession progresses (and lower outflows 
from unemployment gradually translate into longer average spells of joblessness).  In 
Germany, unemployment rates first fell and then increased in 2009 briefly before coming 
down again, but the PLTU first came down and then increased slightly until the end of the 
period.  In Germany there was a declining trend in unemployment and long term 
unemployment, perhaps due to labour market reforms (Hartz Reforms) prior to the Great 
Recession. Although German long term unemployment fell over this period, the levels of 
long term unemployment are higher than in most of the G7 countries (except for Italy). In 
general, the PLTU lags behind increases in the unemployment rate. As we are still in the 
early stages of the recovery, it is expected that PLTU would continue to increase in many 
countries over the next few quarters. 
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Let us now turn to the impact of the Great Recession on the workers of different ages. During 
a recession as the unemployment rate increases, there is usually a large increase in the 
unemployment of young people: firstly, because many of them are new entrants into the 
labour market, secondly, because the young have less work experience and skills and often 
work in casual or temporary jobs, thirdly, because many young people voluntarily quit their 
jobs to find a better job (they are more mobile) but then find it difficult to find a job in a 
recession. Once unemployed, older unemployed workers generally have a lower probability 
of finding work than younger job seekers, either due to employer discrimination or because 
the older workers are likely to be more “choosy” about accepting jobs which are below their 
experience levels. 
Figure 9 shows that since there are a large group of people in the prime age group, not 
surprisingly, they dominate the shares of the long term unemployed. 













Share of Total Increase, 15-24
Share of Total Increase, 25-54
Share of Total Increase, 55-6427 
 
 
Figure 10: Percentage Increases in NLTU by Age in Great Recession 
 
Source: OECD Unemployment duration by gender and age groups_New.xls 
If we now turn to the impact of the Great Recession on the gender distribution we see that in 
many countries the male share of long term unemployment increased  during the Great 
Recession. However, in some cases the male share fell, e.g. in Canada and New Zealand. In 
the G7 countries males dominate the long term unemployed, where the male share was less 
than fifty percent before the recession but increased by 2010 to over fifty percent. During this 
recession, as in many recessions, the industries that are hit hardest by unemployment tend to 
be manufacturing and construction. In these industries, males dominate in employment so we 
would expect the recession to hit males harder than women. It appears that for the G7 
countries that is true, however, for some of the other OECD countries, especially Canada and 
New Zealand the share of males in long term unemployment declined over this period
7
                                                            
7  This is an interesting finding that needs further research. It is possible that emigration from these countries 
provides a safety valve: the New Zealanders migrating to Australia. 
. It is 
often argued that women are more likely to drop out of the labour force during a period of 











% Increase in NLTU 15-24, Great Recession
% Increase in NLTU 25-54, Great Recession
% Increase in NLTU 55-64, Great Recession28 
 
Figure 11: Male Share of Long Term Unemployment, Great Recession 
 
Source: OECD Unemployment duration by gender and age groups_New 
4.  A Comparison of the Great Recession with some previous recessions 
In this section we compare the growth of long term unemployment in the Great Recession 
with earlier recessions and provide a descriptive account. In a subsequent section, we provide 
an analytical explanation of the differences. Although some countries were hit by a recession 
in 2001, most countries were unaffected by it. Figure 12 shows a graph of the unemployment 
rates and Figure 13 shows a graph of the proportion of long term unemployment (PLTU) in 
the G7.  










Male Share of NLTU, 2007Q4
Male Share of NLTU, 2010Q229 
 
Figure 12: Unemployment Rates in the G7 
 
Source: OECD Annual Data 
Figure 13: Proportion of Long Term Unemployment (PLTU) in the G7 
 
Source: OECD Annual PLTU Data 30 
 
 
Since most countries do not have duration data, except for the recent past, the comparison is 
mainly with the recession of the early nineteen-nineties. 





























AUS UR  6.2  10.5  4.3  69.4  4.4  5.2  0.8  18.2 
CAN UR  7.6  11.3  3.7  48.7  5.9  8  2.1  35.6 
FRA UR  8.4  11.6  3.2  38.1  7.9  10  2.1  26.6 
DEU UR     8.1        8  6.8  -1.2  -15.0 
IRL UR  13.2  15.4  2.2  16.7  4.8  13.9  9.1  189.6 
ITA UR  8.9  10.4  1.5  16.9  6.3  8.2  1.9  30.2 
JPN UR  2.1  2.7  0.6  28.6  3.9  5.1  1.2  30.8 
NZL UR  7.7  9.4  1.7  22.1  3.5  6.4  2.9  82.9 
ESP UR  13.1  19.3  6.2  47.3  8.6  20.6  12  139.5 
SWE UR  1.5  9.8  8.3  553.3  6  8.3  2.3  38.3 
GBR UR  6.7  10.1  3.4  50.7  5.1  7.8  2.7  52.9 
USA UR  5.3  6.6  1.3  24.5  4.8  9.6  4.8  100.0 
OECD 
UR  6  7.9  1.9  31.7  5.7  8.5  2.8  49.1 
G7 UR  5.4  7.2  1.8  33.3  5.4  8.1  2.7  50.0 
Source: OECD Harmonised Quarterly URs 
 
Table 4 presents the increases in unemployment rates in the recessions of the early nineteen-
nineties and the Great Recession. What is obvious from this Table is that the Great Recession 
hit Spain, Ireland and the USA very hard, while in the 1990s recession Sweden, Spain, and 
Australia were most hard hit. As discussed earlier we would expect that these differences 
would also be similar when considering the size of the increases in long term unemployment 
in these countries. Unfortunately, unemployment duration data on a quarterly basis are not 
available for most of the OECD countries for a sufficiently long time series to compare these 
two recessions. Initially, we will use annual data for a considerable number of the OECD 
countries, and then look in more detail at the USA for which we have duration data on a 
quarterly basis. 
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Figure 12: Unemployment Rates in Two Recessions 
 
Source: OECD Harmonised Quarterly URs 
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Table 5: Percentage Increase in Long Term Unemployment, 1990-93 & 2007-2009 
  
% Increase in 
LTU, 1990-93 
% Increase in 
LTU 2007-2009 
% Increase in 
PLTU, 1990-93 
% Increase in 
PLTU 2007-2009 
AUS   179.6  26.6  74.1  -4.4 
AUT  
 
-12.4     -24.5 
BEL   -8.3  -5.5  -21.1  -12.1 
CAN   225.6  49.9  129.6  6.5 
DEU   72.3  -28.0  -14.4  -19.7 
DNK   8.6  -10.1  -14.9  -43.7 
ESP   34.2  171.7  -6.4  20.1 
FIN      -12.3     -27.0 
FRA   9.4  2.9  -10.6  -11.6 
G7   36.7  28.9  4.5  -13.5 
GBR   80.6  50.6  25.2  3.4 
GRC   39.9  -5.4  1.8  -18.3 
IRL   1.4  145.5  -11.6  -2.7 
ITA   -16.6  21.7  -17.8  -5.8 
JPN   -11.1  17.7  -19.0  -10.8 
NLD   -20.2  -30.6  -6.8  -36.5 
NOR   55.0  18.4  33.2  -10.6 
NZL   167.5  92.9  107.7  12.1 
OECD   49.8  23.3  2.5  -16.0 
PRT   -12.9  10.1  -21.4  -6.6 
SWE   560.1  38.3  31.2  -0.6 
TUR   11.7  21.6  -1.0  -16.7 
USA   165.6  229.3  109.4  63.3 
Source: OECD Annual Data 
Table 5 shows that the early nineteen-nineties recession was much more severe for Australia, 
Canada, New Zealand, and the USA compared to some of the other countries. However, since 
these data are annual they do not reflect the growth of long term unemployment in the Great 
Recession, as the data end in 2009 while the effects of the recession are still being felt. As we 
saw in the earlier section, long term unemployment continued to increase in most countries 
into 2010.  
Table 6 combines data from the annual series for the 1990s recession with the quarterly series 
of the Great Recession to give a better picture since the quarterly data are more recent and in 
general, long term unemployment tends to continue to increase for a much longer time than 
the unemployment rate. 33 
 































AUS  179.62  15.63  74.12  67.40  4.55  31.59 
AUT           7.42  -1.31  -5.16 
BEL  -8.26  -14.13  -21.07  18.62  -3.03  -5.83 
CAN  225.58  9.14  129.63  139.59  3.98  53.11 
DEU  72.26  -6.74  -14.42  -32.02  -9.59  -16.93 
DNK  8.59  -4.38  -14.91  227.17  5.84  39.95 
ESP  34.16  -3.41  -6.41  357.95  18.03  92.96 
FIN           51.10  5.44  24.51 
FRA  9.39  -3.72  -10.55  32.73  3.39  9.02 
GBR  80.61  8.55  25.20  114.96  8.01  32.65 
GRC  39.87  0.88  1.78  46.46  -3.28  -6.63 
IRL  1.39  -7.60  -11.61  408.95  21.50  76.58 
ITA  -16.55  -12.43  -17.83  24.15  4.65  10.23 
JPN  -11.11  -3.56  -18.99  -100.00  -34.54  -100.00 
NLD  -20.18  -3.31  -6.79  9.06  -10.95  -28.44 
NOR  55.00  6.78  33.25  105.17  4.16  24.82 
NZL  167.53  16.09  107.72  221.88  2.91  68.85 
PRT  -12.88  -9.56  -21.38  57.89  6.53  13.88 
SWE  560.09  3.77  31.22  87.37  3.92  26.99 
TUR  11.73  -0.45  -0.98  35.12  1.71  6.94 
USA  165.63  6.01  109.41  532.82  20.92  234.79 
 
Source: OECD Annual and Quarterly data 
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SWE  NZL  CAN  USA  IRL  USA 
CAN  AUS  USA  IRL  USA  ESP 
AUS  CAN  NZL  ESP  ESP  IRL 
NZL  GBR  AUS  DNK  GBR  NZL 
USA  NOR  NOR  NZL  PRT  CAN 
 
Source: Table 6 
Tables 6 and 7 provide a better picture of the impact of the two recessions on long term 
unemployment. The USA clearly did worse in the Great Recession, compared to the 1990s 
recession in terms of the growth of the numbers in long term unemployment, as well as in 
terms of the percentage of long term unemployment (PLTU). Ireland and Spain also did very 
badly in the Great Recession compared to the 1990s recession. If we use the percentage 
increase in NLTU the USA had the biggest increase in the Great Recession, followed by 
Ireland, Spain, Denmark and New Zealand. In the 1990s recession, Sweden did the worst, 
followed by Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the USA. In terms of the Percentage point 
increase in PLTU, in the Great Recession Ireland did the worst followed by the USA, Spain, 
Great Britain, and Portugal. In the 1990s recession in terms of the Percentage Point increase 
in PLTU, the worst case was New Zealand followed by Australia, Canada, Great Britain, and 
Norway. In terms of the Percentage increase in PLTU in the Great Recession, the USA was 
the worst affected followed by Spain, Ireland, New Zealand, and Canada. In the 1990s 
recession in terms of the Percentage increase in PLTU, Canada fared the worst, followed by 
the USA, New Zealand, Australia, and Norway.  Clearly the rankings depend on which 
measure we use. There is no obvious “correct” measure. In the literature we usually use 
PLTU, and the percentage increase in PLTU. However, in all these alternative metrics we 
find that in the Great Recession the USA, Ireland and Spain did very badly.  35 
 
In the next section we look at the USA in more detail as unemployment duration data on a 
quarterly basis are available for a longer period. 
5.  A Detailed Analysis of USA 
In this section, we make use of quarterly data for the USA from 1970  Q1  for the 
unemployment rate, and 1976 Q1 for data on the numbers of long term unemployed (NLTU) 
and the proportion of long term unemployment (PLTU), to compare long term unemployment 
in the last four recessions (Figures 13 and 14). The unemployment rate went up significantly 
in the recession of the early 1970s (peaked in the second quarter of 1975) and we see that 
NLTU and PLTU begin to fall from 1976 Q1 (when the data series begin). The 1980s 
recession saw a big increase in unemployment rates (rising from 1980 Q1 and peaking in 
1982 Q4). As a result NLTU also rises and peaks in 1983 Q2 while PLTU rises and peaks in 
1984 Q1. The subsequent recessions of the 1990s and the early 2000 were milder in terms of 
the peaks of unemployment rates and of NLTU and PLTU. The troughs of the unemployment 
rate, NLTU and PLTU after the recession of the early 2000 were higher than the previous 
recession. The Great Recession shows that the unemployment rates and the NLTU and PLTU 
jump up at a very rapid rate (unseen before this period).  
Figure 13: A Time Series of NLTU, PLTU and UR for the USA 
 









































































































































































Figure 14: NLTU and PLTU in the Great Recession 
 


























Figure 15 shows that the Great Recession was clearly the most severe in recent history with 
PLTU rising more rapidly than in any of the previous recessions. If you exclude the recession 
of the 1980s, each successive recession has PLTU beginning at a higher level than the 
previous recession.  
Table 8 plots a time line for the minima and maxima of the percentage of long term 
unemployment, and the duration between each minimum and maximum. It shows that in the 
1980s recession it took 15 Quarters for it to reach a maximum, and 25 Quarters for it to reach 
the next minimum; in the 1990s recession it took 17 Quarters to reach a maximum and 28 
Quarters to the next minimum; in the 2001 recession it took 12 Quarters to reach a maximum 
and only 15 Quarters to reach a minimum. Note, however, that each minimum is higher than 
the preceding one, and that it takes a long time to reach a maximum. 
Table 8: Peaks and Troughs in Long Term Unemployment 
   PLTU    
1980  3.643  min 
Duration     15Q 
1983.75  14.3208  max 
Duration     25Q 
1990  5.04507  min 
Duration     17Q 
1994.25  12.5064  max 
Duration     28Q 
2001.25  5.56048  min 
Duration     12Q 
2004.25  13.3833  max 
Duration     15Q 
2008  9.24203  min 
Source: USA_DUR.xls 
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Figure 16: Four Cycles of Long Term Unemployment (PLTU), USA 
 
Source: USA_UDUR.xls, author’s calculations. 
In order to compare the changes in PLTU we have indexed the beginning of each recession as 
100 in Figure 16
8
If we turn to how recessions hit males and females, we see that males have a much larger 
increase in long term unemployment. As Table 9 and Figures 17a and b show the increases in 
. This Figure 15 shows clearly that the early stages of the Great Recession 
produced the steepest percentage increase in the proportion of long term unemployment 
(PLTU). This diagram also clearly shows that long term unemployment (as measured by 
PLTU) increases very rapidly but comes down very slowly. Since the present cycle is not yet 
over, it is unclear whether the total rise in PLTU will end up being a larger or smaller than the 
total rise following the  1980s recession, but it will probably be of a similar magnitude. 
Another feature that stands out from this figure is that PLTU increases more rapidly than it 
falls: there appears to be an asymmetrical response to increases and decreases in 
unemployment rates. We will consider this in our econometric analysis later in this paper. In 
each of the four recessions considered, once long term unemployment (PLTU) has increased, 
it never returns to the previous minimum, although it nearly did in the 1990s. 
                                                            
8  This diagram is clearly affected by the start date chosen for recessions as we have indexed it to 100. There is 
a question whether the recession of 1980 is really just a continuation of an earlier 1979 recession, in which 
case the diagram may look different. 39 
 
male and female long term unemployment in the Great Recession was spectacular compared 
to earlier recessions. Of course, as the participation rate of females has increased over the 
past few decades, the number of long term unemployed (NLTU) may exaggerate the 
increases in long term unemployment, and hence the proportion of long term unemployment 
(PLTU) which normalises the numbers of long term unemployed by the total unemployed is a 
better metric. 
Table 9: Male and Female Long Term Unemployment in Four Recessions 
  










of LTU (PLTU), 
1564 
Female Proportion 
of LTU (PLTU), 
1564 
1981  389.2  187.6  7.7  5.3 
1983  1025.9  418.9  13.7  8.7 
Percentage 
Increase  163.6  123.4  77.7  66.2 
1990.5  265.9  111.8  7.3  3.3 
1992.25  712.2  345.4  12.9  8.7 
Percentage 
Increase  167.8  209.0  76.1  159.4 
2001.25  189.4  149.5  5.7  5.3 
2003.25  660.1  407.8  13.6  10.6 
Percentage 
Increase  248.5  172.7  136.5  98.0 
2007.75  386.4  317.9  10.4  10.3 
2010.75  2466.9  1757.8  32.2  29.3 
Percentage 
Increase  538.5  452.9  211.1  185.5 
Source: USA_UDUR.xlsx 
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If we turn to the distribution of unemployment and long term unemployment by industry 
breakdown (agriculture, industry, and services) we see (Figure 18) that the share of industry 
Long Term Unemployment increased more in the 2001 recession than in the Great Recession. 
However, the percentage point increases in the Proportion of Long Term Unemployment 








If we now turn to the breakdown of long term unemployment by skills (Figure 19), we see 
that there was a greater increase in the Proportion of Long Term Unemployment (PLTU) for 
each skill level in the Great Recession compared to the recession of 2001. 
Figure 19: Percentage Point Increase in the Proportion of Long Term Unemployment 
by Skill 
 













































If we look at the shares of long term unemployment in total long term unemployment by skill 
(Figure 20), we see that there was a bigger increase in the high skill share of LTU and a 
greater fall in that of low skilled workers in the 2001 recession compared to the Great 
Recession. 
Figure 20: Shares of Long Term Unemployment by Skill 
 
Source: USA-Unemployment duration by education and migration status.xlsx (18-03-2011, 
Sebastien Martin). 
If we now turn to look at the shares of migrants who are in long term unemployment from 
low and high skill jobs (Figure 21), we see that there was a slight upward trend in the ratio of 
migrant to natives from low skill jobs after about 2004 Q3 and a huge upward spike with the 
beginning of the Great Recession. There was also a slight downward trend in the ratio of 
migrants to natives in long term unemployment from high skill jobs. There appears to be 
























































































Low Skill Share of LTU
High Skill Share of LTU
Med Skill Share of LTU43 
 
Figure 21: Shares of Migrants by Skill in Long Term Unemployment 
 
Source: USA-Unemployment duration by education and migration status.xlsx (18-03-2011, 
Sebastien Martin). 





















































































Low Skill Ratio of Migrant to 
Native LTU 
High Skill Ratio of Migrant to 
Native LTU44 
 
Table 10a: Volatility of the Proportion of Long Term Unemployment, USA, 
1976 Q1 to 2010 Q4 
   Std Dev 
Coefficient of 
Variation 
Male PLTU 1564  4.61  0.43 
Female PLTU 1564  4.41  0.56 
PLTU 1564  4.46  0.47 
Male PLTU 1524  3.34  0.53 
Female PLTU 1524  2.85  0.61 
PLTU 1524  3.08  0.55 
Male PLTU 2554  5.06  0.40 
Female PLTU 2554  4.82  0.52 
PLTU 2554  4.84  0.44 
Male PLTU 5564  6.15  0.34 
Female PLTU 5564  6.10  0.47 




As an index of volatility of the proportion of long term unemployment (PLTU), Table 10a 
shows the coefficient of variation for different age and gender groups over the entire period, 
1976 Q1 to 2010 Q4
9
                                                            
9 We did try to provide similar results by removing a simple time trend, but since there was a huge jump of 
long term unemployment in the Great Recession, a simple time trend does not fit the data well. We did not try 
any other sophisticated detrending methods. However, we estimated similar coefficients of variation by age 
for four different recessions separately, see Table 10(b) below.  
. In general, the volatility of PLTU is greater for females than for males.  
To see changes in volatility over time we have calculated the coefficients of variation for 
males and females (by age) for four recessions, see Table 10(b) below. 
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Table 10(b): Volatility of the Proportion of Long Term Unemployment over Four 
Recessions 
   MPLTU, 15-24  MPLTU, 25-54  MPLTU, 55-64 
1981Q1 - 
1983Q1  0.25  0.31  0.29 
1990Q3 - 
1992Q2  0.31  0.26  0.24 
2001Q2 - 
2003Q2  0.34  0.31  0.28 
2007Q4 - 
2010Q4  0.45  0.50  0.46 
   FPLTU, 15-24  FPLTU, 25-54  FPLTU, 55-64 
1981Q1 - 
1983Q1  0.24  0.34  0.46 
1990Q3 - 
1992Q2  0.28  0.37  0.42 
2001Q2 - 
2003Q2  0.23  0.31  0.27 
2007Q4 - 
2010Q4  0.40  0.47  0.44 
Source: USA_UDUR.xlsx 
 
This data shows that in general there is greater volatility in the proportion of long term 
unemployment for younger males than younger females; middle aged and older females have 
higher volatility than the respectively aged males, except in the Great Recession. It is also 
clear that there was a big jump in volatility of the proportion of long term unemployment 
during the Great Recession for both males and females for all age groups. The one exception 
is that for older females the early 1980s was worse that the Great Recession. Figures 22a and 
22b show these measures of volatility.  
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Figure 22a: Volatility in the Proportion of Long Term Unemployment in Four 
Recessions by Age (Coefficients of Variation) 
 































When we calculated a thirteen quarter moving coefficient of variation we found that it was 
more volatile in the 1980s recession than the recessions of the early 1990s or the early 2000s. 
However, the Great Recession saw a huge increase in the volatility, much larger than in all 
the previous recessions since 1976. It is interesting to note that the although the volatility is 
generally similar for males and females, there is a bigger increase for females in the 1990s 
recession, and then a huge jump in the Great Recession for both males and females, see 
Figure 23. 
Figure 23: Volatility of the Proportion of Long Term Unemployment 
 
Source: USA_UDUR.xlsx 
































































































































Moving Coeff Var of MPLTU 1564 (13 Q)
Moving Coeff Var of FPLTU 1564 (13 Q)48 
 
 


















MNLTU 1524  101.4  205.6  235.3  294.4 
MPLTU 1524  69.0  123.8  170.4  151.5 
FNLTU 1524  82.6  263.7  140.4  309.4 
FPLTU 1524  53.1  221.1  86.6  148.8 
MNLTU 2554  201.4  158.2  234.6  617.2 
MPLTU 2554  75.2  61.8  110.8  223.8 
FNLTU 2554  151.8  187.7  169.6  484.5 
FPLTU 2554  71.4  136.7  94.8  188.9 
MNLTU 5564  158.9  179.5  364.6  683.6 
MPLTU 5564  43.6  58.0  135.0  162.7 
FNLTU 5564  84.9  360.1  262.3  544.3 
FPLTU 5564  34.5  234.9  89.6  173.4 
Source: USA_UDUR.xlsx 
Table 11 provides an interesting breakdown by age and gender: in general, there is bigger 
increase for males than females, except in the 1990s recession when females of all age groups 
had substantially larger increases than males. In the Great Recession, the percentage increase 
in numbers in long term unemployment (NLTU) were much larger (for all groups) than in the 
previous recessions. However, in the Great Recession the percentage increase in the 
proportion of long term unemployment (PLTU) was in general greater than for the earlier 
recessions except for the age group 15-24. This is because there was a much larger 
percentage increase in the number of young unemployed in the Great Recession compared to 
earlier recessions.   
Aaronson et al. (2010) provide a breakdown of the long term unemployed in terms of their 
background characteristics. They find that, not surprisingly, the less educated, blacks and 
Hispanics are over-represented in the ranks of the long term unemployed.  In the Great 
Recession the long term unemployed were more likely to come from professional and 
business services and finance and insurance, and real estate relative to the recession of the 
1980s. They find that as the labour force has aged, the average duration has increased. They 
also find that exit probabilities out of unemployment have driven the increased 49 
 
unemployment in the present recession. They also argue that the extension of unemployment 
insurance benefits in the US led to an increase in unemployment duration. However, since the 
UI benefits were increased  because  of the increased unemployment and long term 
unemployment  the causation  also  runs in the opposite direction. It is still too early to 
substantiate their statement that the UI benefits extension can explain “10-25 percent of the 
total increase” (Aaronson et al., 2010, p. 40) in average duration since July 2008. 
6.  What explains the increases in long term unemployment 
As discussed earlier, an increase in the unemployment rate leads after a lag to an increase in 
long term unemployment. When an economy is hit by a negative shock, there is initially an 
increase in the inflows into the unemployment stock. As the newly unemployed join the 
unemployed stock, some of the existing unemployed find it more difficult to find work 
(assuming that the number of vacancies remains constant). Hence there is an increase in the 
numbers of long term unemployed (NLTU). For example, if all the exits from unemployment 
were of (say) the new entrants into the unemployment stock, then the remainder of the 
unemployed stock would “become older”, that is have longer durations. If there was a big 
increase in inflows, there would be an initial decrease in the proportion of long term 
unemployment (PLTU), but after some time PLTU would increase. In general, what happens 
in a recession is that along with the initial jump in inflows into the unemployment stock, the 
probability of finding a job falls (as there has been a fall in labour demand) so that the exit 
probabilities (or hazards) fall. Hence there is an increase in the numbers of long term 
unemployed, and then slowly an increase in the proportion of long term unemployment. 
In an interesting paper Aaronson et al. (2010) carry out a detailed study on US data and find a 
close relationship between the long term unemployment and the unemployment rate. They 
find that there was a shift in the relationship since 2008. 
 
In the following Figures  24a through 24g  we see a very close relationship between the 
proportion of long term unemployment (PLTU) and the lagged unemployment rates in the G7 
countries, although the lag between the increases in the unemployment rate and the increases 
in the proportion of long term unemployment (PLTU) vary from country to country. In our 
econometric analysis using panel data we will allow for this heterogeneity. 
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Figure 24c: The Relationship between PLTU and the Unemployment Rate, UK 
 
 
Figure 24d: The Relationship between PLTU and the Unemployment Rate, Italy 
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Figure 24f: The Relationship between PLTU and the Unemployment Rate, France 
 
 
   53 
 
Figure 24g: The Relationship between PLTU and the Unemployment Rate, Germany 
 
 
Source: PLTU and UR, G7.xls 
Note: Except for Figure 24b, all others have different scales for UR and PLTU. 
 
7.   Econometric Analyses  
(a) OECD Panel Data 
There have been earlier studies that have estimated aggregate functions for the incidence of 
long term unemployment (PLTU) on lagged unemployment rates, see Guichard and Rusticelli 
(2010), Jackman and Layard (1991), Chapman, Junankar, and Kapuscinski (1992), Junankar 
and Kapuscinski (1991). For this study, we have used quarterly data for a panel of OECD 





Where   is the proportion of long term unemployment in country i at time t,   is 
the unemployment rate for country i at time t-j, and    is the lagged dependent 
variable. To avoid problems of endogeneity of the unemployment rate, we have only used 
lagged terms  (pre-determined variables).  Since both the unemployment and long term 
unemployment rates are bounded between zero and one they cannot (by definition) be non-
stationary. As such, we did not test for stationarity. In any case, the length of the time series 
is too small as the power of stationarity tests is very low. 
We estimated this model using quarterly data for persons (males and females) for the OECD 
countries as an unbalanced sample, as a pooled regression and as a fixed effects panel 
regression, see Table 12. We initially ran regressions with eight lags on the unemployment 
rate and on the lagged dependent variables. We imposed zero restrictions on the lags from 3 
to 8 periods on the unemployment rate and from 5 to 8 lags on the dependent variable and we 
could not reject the restrictions. We then estimated the equation with only two lags on the 
unemployment rate and four lags on the dependent variable and the equation performed well 
with most of the variables being significantly different from zero. Again, we tested to see if 
the unemployment rates (as a set) and the lagged PLTUs were statistically significant by 
testing zero restrictions: we rejected the zero restrictions.  We then tested to see if the 
parameters of the model were stable after the Great Recession by introducing a dummy 
variable equal to zero until 2007 Q3 and 1 thereafter (interacted with the right hand side 
variables). We rejected these zero restrictions, hence there appears to have been a break in 
the relationship between PLTU and unemployment rates and lagged dependent variables. 
These results show that the lagged unemployment rates are very significant, and the lagged 
dependent variable is large and very significant. This suggests that it would take very long to 
lower the percentage of long term unemployment, even after the unemployment rates come 
down.
10
                                                            
10  We tested for the robustness of these estimates by eliminating one country at a time from our sample. 
These results suggest that they are quite sensitive to the countries excluded from the sample. These results 
are available on request from the author. 
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Table 12 Pooled and Fixed Effects Regressions on Quarterly Data (Persons) 
                     (1)             (2)    
                     pltu            pltu 
        Pooled    Fixed Effects    
-------------------------------------------- 
l1ur                1.086***        0.180    
                   (3.76)          (0.64)    
l2ur               -0.992***        0.478*   
                  (-3.43)          (1.66)    
l1pltu              0.748***        0.593*** 
                  (23.29)         (18.88)    
l2pltu            -0.0289         -0.0496    
                  (-0.72)         (-1.34)    
l3pltu             0.0879**        0.0768**  
                   (2.25)          (2.13)    
l4pltu              0.176***        0.195*** 
                   (5.79)          (6.80)    
q2                  1.024***        0.936*** 
                   (4.21)          (4.17)    
q3                  0.158           0.190    
                   (0.66)          (0.86)    
q4                  0.865***        0.819*** 
                   (3.48)          (3.56)    
gfc                -1.141**        -1.318**  
                  (-2.16)         (-2.57)    
gfcl1ur            -1.267***       -1.424*** 
                  (-2.98)         (-3.52)    
gfcl2ur             1.692***        1.823*** 
                   (3.78)          (4.26)    
gfcl1pltu           0.131**        0.0720    
                   (2.20)          (1.29)    
gfcl2pltu          0.0276          0.0607    
                   (0.36)          (0.86)    
gfcl3pltu          -0.124*         -0.101    
                  (-1.66)         (-1.47)    
gfcl4pltu         -0.0912         -0.0812    
                  (-1.58)         (-1.49)    
_cons              -0.610**         0.356    
                  (-2.12)          (0.69)    
-------------------------------------------- 
N                    1343            1343    
-------------------------------------------- 
Equation 1: F( 16,  1326) = 2547.74 
Adj R-squared =  0.9681 
Tests for Structural Break: F(  7,  1326) =   11.69; Prob > F =    0.0000 
Equation 2: R-sq:   
within  = 0.8113  
between = 0.9804                                
overall = 0.9562 
Tests for Structural Break: F(  7,  1297) =    9.48; Prob > F =    0.0000 
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Guichard and Rusticelli estimate a model on an unbalanced sample of OECD countries 
allowing for some institutional variables. However, they have used averaged data (three year 
moving average for the unemployment rate
11
Our regression results (Table 12) support the earlier argument that the percentage of long 
term unemployment is determined by lagged unemployment rates and lagged dependent 
variable
), and curiously in these estimations reported in 
Tables 2 and 3 they do not include lagged long term unemployment (which is large in 
magnitude and significant for most countries in Table 1). Also given that most of the 
institutional variables are almost constant over time, it is not clear what the coefficients mean. 
Their results suggest that there is a positive association between long term unemployment 
and Employment Protection Legislation, and negative relation with Long term unemployment 
benefits. Also as mentioned earlier, variables like duration of unemployment benefits are 
likely to be endogenous and hence should be treated as such in the estimations.  
12
(b) Econometric Analysis using differences data 
. The data for the G7 countries provided a visual support for this model in Figures 
24a through 24g (see above). 
Ideally our model should be extended to allow for a range of other variables, including 
employment protection, unemployment benefit duration (which is likely to be endogenous), 
active labour market policies (again likely to be endogenous). In some further analysis, 
reported below, we have attempted to control for some of these variables. 
We explored the  effects of some institutional variables like Employment Protection 
Legislation and the impact of unemployment benefits (replacement rates) on the increases in 
long term unemployment over different recessions. We used a pooled data set of the increases 
in long term unemployment for each country in each recession (2001 and 2007 recessions
13
                                                            
11 The justification given by Guichard and Rusticelli (2010) for using a three year moving average of the 
unemployment rate (on annual or quarterly data?) was essentially to save degrees of freedom, but they lose 
the dynamics of long term unemployment. From their account on page 13, it appears that the estimates are 
based on using Zellner’s SURE estimation method on each country equation treated like a separate equation 
but imposing the same coefficients on the independent variables (did they test the restrictions?), with some 
countries that would have very few observations. It would seem sensible to treat their results with some 
caution. 
12 Guichard and Rusticelli (2010) estimate similar equations for some OECD countries (country by country). In 
many cases they obtain insignificant coefficients. (It is not clear if they used quarterly or annual data.) 
13 For most countries the data did not extend to earlier recessions. 
). 
Unfortunately the OECD data on institutional variables is only available on an annual basis, 57 
 
and that too is such that there is little variation over time for these variables  for most 
countries. In order to experiment on the effects of these institutional variables on long term 
unemployment, we estimated equations for the increase in long term unemployment as a 
function of the unemployment rate and the average Employment Protection Level (EPL) and 
the average Gross Replacement Rate (ub_grr). We tried several alternative metrics for the 
increase in long term unemployment rate: the percentage increase in NLTU (PNLTU), the 
percentage increase in PLTU  (PIPLTU), and the percentage point increase in PLTU 
(PPTLTU). Similarly, we tried alternative measures of unemployment: the average 
unemployment during each recession, the percentage increase in the unemployment rate, and 
the percentage point increase in the unemployment rate. We also tested to see if the Great 
Recession was significantly different from the 2001 recession, by introducing a zero-one 
dummy for the Great Recession and interacting it with all the right hand side variables and 
tested zero restrictions on these variables. 
In Table 13  we present the results for these regressions.  We have alternatively used as 
dependent variables the percentage increase in the proportion of long term unemployment 
(pipltu), the percentage point increase in the proportion of long term unemployment (pptpltu), 
and the percentage increase in the numbers of long term unemployed (pnltu) (the increases 
being measured over the period 2001 Q2 to 2004 Q 2 and over the period of the Great 
Recession, 2007 Q4 to 2010 Q3. We regressed them respectively on the percentage increase 
in the unemployment rate (pi_ur), the percentage point increase in the unemployment rate 
(ppt_ur). In addition, we used the averages of the Employment Protection Level (epl) and the 
Unemployment Benefit Gross Replacement Rate (ub_grr). As mentioned earlier these two 
variables were based on annual data that did not vary much from year to year.  
As we can see in Table 13, the increase in the unemployment rate (measured in either way) 
was very significant. In all cases the employment protection variable was not statistically 
significant (even at the ten percent level), while the replacement rate was only significant at 
the ten percent level for the percentage point increase in the proportion of long term 
unemployment, but with a negative sign. In other words, the higher the replacement rate the 
lower the percentage point increase in the proportion of long term unemployment. Further, 
the EPL variable when interacted with the dummy for the Great Recession was negative but 
not significant even at the ten percent level for any of the dependent variables. The Great 
Recession dummy interacted with the replacement rate was positive and statistically 58 
 
significant only in the case of dependent variable pptpltu, but only at the ten percent level. 
However, since we were unable to reject the zero restrictions on structural stability there is no 
link between the replacement rate and the dependent variables. 
In other words, these regressions suggest that the increase in unemployment rate significantly 
increases long term unemployment. In general, when we tested for structural stability we 
were unable to reject the zero restrictions at the five percent level. In other words, there was 
no structural break between the recession of the early 2000s and the Great Recession for 
increases in long term unemployment. Note, however, that we found a significant structural 
break when we used time series data for levels of the percentage of long term unemployment. 
Table 13: Cross Country Regressions for Two Recessions 
 
1  2  3 
 
pipltu  pptpltu  pnltu 
epl  -13.24  0.111  -16.57 
 
(-0.99)  (0.11)  (-1.04) 
ub_grr  -0.729  -0.149*  -0.71 
 
(-1.51)  (-1.75)  (-1.21) 







GFC  -14.94  -10.16  -26.27 
 
(-0.25)  (-1.31)  (-0.32) 







GFC_epl  -13.83  -4.551  -25.23 
 
(-0.54)  (-1.65)  (-0.69) 
GFC_ub_grr  1.351  0.571**  1.122 
 





   
(2.49) 




   
(-0.44) 
  _cons  38.19  2.218  47.83 
 
(1.19)  (0.87)  (1.24) 
N  43  43  43 
 
Notation: 
Pipltu: Percentage Increase in Proportion of Long Term Unemployment (PLTU) 
Pptpltu: Percentage Point Increase in PLTU 59 
 
Pnltu: Percentage increase in the numbers of long term unemployed (NLTU) 
Epl: Employment Protection Legislation (average for each period) 
Ub_grr: Unemployment Benefit gross replacement rate (average for each period) 
Pi_ur: Percentage increase in Unemployment Rate 
Ppt_ur: Percentage point increase in Unemployment Rate 
GFC: Dummy for Global Financial Crisis (zero for first period, 1 for second period) 
 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Equation 1: 
F(7, 35) = 6.27 
Prob > F = 0.0001 
R-squared = 0.5635 
Structural Stability Tests: Cannot reject zero restrictions 
F(4, 35) = 0.74 
Prob > F = 0.5686 
 
Equation 2: 
F(7, 35) = 9.74 
Prob > F =  0.0000 
R-squared = 0.5229 
Structural Stability Tests: Reject zero restriction only at 10 % significance levels. 
F(4, 35) = 2.18 
Prob > F = 0.0921 
 
Equation 3: 
F(7, 35) = 15.44 
Prob > F = 0.0000 
R-squared = 0.8785 
Structural Stability Tests: Cannot reject zero restrictions 
F(4, 35) = 1.36 60 
 
Prob > F = 0.2661 
 
The results using fixed effects estimation on the same data set gave very similar results.  
 
(c) Econometric Analyses of Time Series Data, USA 
In this section we use fairly long time series quarterly data for the United States and for the 
United Kingdom. Again our model is based on estimating the proportion of long term 
unemployment  (PLTU)  as a function of lagged unemployment rates (UR)  and lagged 
dependent variables, a measure of openness of the economy (Open) defined as (Exports + 
Imports)/GDP), and a dummy for the Global Financial Crisis interacted with all the 
independent variables.  The results  for both countries  suggest that there is a significant 
relationship between the lagged unemployment rates (UR t-i) and the proportion of long term 
unemployment (PLTU), as well as with lagged dependent variables.  
For the USA, we estimated equations for US time series data from 1976 (Q1) to 2010 (Q4). 
The model was estimated with four lags on UR and four lags on PLTU, with quarterly 
dummies, a zero-one dummy for the Global Financial Crisis (gfc), and then interacted with 
all the right hand side variables. The results are provided in Table 14. Following Hendry’s 
method of General to Specific (GeTS), we tested for zero restrictions on the four lags of UR 
and rejected the restrictions, and for zero restrictions on four lags on PLTU and rejected these 
restrictions; we tested for zero restrictions on the GFC variable and interacted with all the 
other variables and rejected the zero restrictions implying that there was a structural break 
after the GFC.  
Our results suggest that the proportion of long term unemployment (PLTU) increases with 
the unemployment rate and that the higher the previous periods PLTU, the higher is the 
present PLTU. In other words, when the unemployment rate increases, PLTU increases for a 
long time afterwards (there is persistence in the series). We find that the more open the US 
economy becomes the larger the proportion of long term unemployment. Note that Open is 
positive and significant. This requires further investigation. The results suggest that the global 
crisis significantly altered the relationship between PLTU and lagged unemployment rates 
and lagged PLTU. 
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Table 14: US Time Series Regressions, 1976 Q1-2010Q4 
   PLTU 
UR(t-1)  0.0005 
   (0.002) 
UR(t-2)  0.0085* 
   (0.004) 
UR(t-3)  -0.0005 
   (0.005) 
UR(t-4)  -0.0025 
   (0.003) 
PLTU(t-1)  0.7920*** 
   (0.094) 
PLTU(t-2)  0.2435** 
   (0.115) 
PLTU(t-3)  -0.3883*** 
   (0.113) 
PLTU(t-4)  0.1528* 
   (0.078) 
gfc  0.2011 
   (0.217) 
open  0.1342*** 
   (0.031) 
gfc*UR(t-1)  -0.0166 
   (0.016) 
gfc*UR(t-2)  -0.0003 
   (0.014) 
gfc*UR(t-3)  0.0049 
   (0.023) 
gfc*UR(t-4)  0.0671*** 
   (0.015) 
gfc*PLTU(t-1)  -1.2336*** 
   (0.383) 
gfc*PLTU(t-2)  -0.7656** 
   (0.373) 
gfc*PLTU(t-3)  0.3866 
   (0.400) 
gfc*PLTU(t-4)  0.3582 
   (0.350) 
gfc*open  -1.1337 
   (0.839) 
_cons  -0.0470*** 
   (0.010) 
N  136 
Adj R-squared  0.9857 62 
 
Note:  Parentheses contain standard errors.  The model was estimated with quarterly 
dummies, but are not presented in the table above. 
 
Test Zero Restrictions on UR (Reject) 
F(4, 113) = 15.15 
Prob> F = 0.0000 
 
Test Zero Restrictions on PLTU (Reject) 
F(4, 113) = 64.13 
Prob > F = 0.0000 
 
Test Zero Restrictions on PLTU (t-3) and PLTU (t-4) (Reject) 
F(2, 113) = 6.36 
Prob > F = 0.0024 
 
Test Zero Restrictions on GFC and all interactive terms (Reject) 
F(10, 113) = 7.67 
Prob > F = 0.0000 
 
We used the estimated model to provide projections for 2011 Q1 to 2012 Q4 for the time 
paths of the proportion of long term unemployment (PLTU) based on two alternative time 
paths for the unemployment rate. The first alternative is based on the OECD projections and 




This latter alternative is not meant to imply that we predict that the unemployment rate will 
remain at this level but simply to provide an alternative path under pessimistic assumptions. 
These results are provided in Table 15. 
Table 15: Projections of the Proportion of Long Term Unemployment  
UR Projection 1  PLTU 1  UR Projection 2  PLTU2 
2011q1  9  0.30785  9  0.30785 
2011q2  8.8  0.35512  9  0.35512 
2011q3  8.5  0.32706  9  0.32383 
2011q4  8.3  0.31127  9  0.30628 
2012q1  8  0.2847  9  0.28231 
2012q2  7.8  0.32316  9  0.33159 
2012q3  7.5  0.28289  9  0.30306 
2012q4  7.2  0.26475  9  0.28423 
 
                                                            
14 We note that the unemployment rate in the USA has gone up from 9.1 % to 9.2 %.  However, it is not clear at 
present if that is likely to remain at this level. 63 
 
It is interesting to see that it takes some time before the proportion of long term 
unemployment falls even with a declining rate of the unemployment rate. If the 
unemployment rate remains constant at 9.0 % begins at about the same level before it 
diverges and remains at much higher levels. See Figure 25 below. 
 
Figure 25: Projections of PLTU for USA 
 
Source: Authors calculations. 
(d) Econometric Analyses of Time Series Data, 
The results for the UK are based on estimating a similar model for the proportion of long 
term unemployment (PLTU) using quarterly data from 1992 (Q2) to 2010 Q (2). As for the 
US we estimated a similar model with four lags on the unemployment rate and on PLTU, on 
openness of the economy, the GFC (as a zero-one dummy and interacted with all the right 
hand side variables). In Table 15 we present these results.  














Table 16: UK Time Series (estimated with Quarterly Dummies), 1992 Q2-2010 Q2 
 
PLTU  PLTU 








  UR(t-3)  0.0189  0.0210*** 
 
(0.012)  (0.007) 
UR(t-4)  -0.0094  -0.0059 
 
(0.009)  (0.009) 
PLTU(t-1)  0.6861***  0.6835*** 
 
(0.146)  (0.076) 












  gfc  5.4269**  -0.0347 
 
(2.416)  (0.109) 
open  0.0372  0.0302 
 
(0.044)  (0.044) 








  gfc*UR(t-3)  -0.1352  -0.0121 
 
(0.096)  (0.017) 
gfc*UR(t-4)  0.0519  0.0236 
 
(0.040)  (0.025) 
gfc*PLTU(t-1)  -0.8894*  -0.3022 
 
(0.520)  (0.326) 












  gfc*open  -6.8582**  0.0795 
 
(3.216)  (0.194) 
_cons  -0.034  -0.0246 
 
(0.032)  (0.031) 
N  69  69 
Adj R-squared  0.9908  0.9902 65 
 
As earlier, we tested various zero restrictions:  
Test Zero Restrictions on UR (Reject) 
F(4, 46) = 7.15 
Prob > F = 0.0001 
  Test Zero Restrictions on PLTU (Reject) 
F(4, 46) = 23.27 
Prob > F = 0.0000 
  Test Zero Restrictions on UR (t-1) and UR (t-2) (Cannot Reject) 
F(  2,    46) = 0.28 
Prob > F = 0.7555 
 
Test Zero Restrictions on PLTU (t-2) PLTU (t-3) and PLTU (t-4) (Cannot Reject) 
F(3, 46) = 0.34 
Prob > F = 0.7956 
 
Test Zero Restrictions on GFC and all interactive terms (Cannot Reject) 
F(10, 46) = 1.40 
Prob > F = 0.2109 
 
We rejected the zero restrictions on four lags of UR and on four lags of PLTU. However, we 
could not reject zero restrictions on the first two lags of UR and on PLTU (t-2) PLTU (t-3) 
and PLTU (t-4). Similarly, we could not reject the zero restrictions on all the interactive 
terms of the GFC, hence there does not appear to be a significant structural break for the 
UK. As before, we find that an increase in the unemployment rate leads to an increase in 
PLTU, and there is persistence (as the lagged PLTU is also significant). However, unlike for 
the USA, openness does not play a role.  
 
(e) Summary of Econometric Results 
Over the past decade many countries increased labour market flexibility with an increasing 
number of workers on temporary contracts and flexibility to alter working hours, see IMF 
(2010). Those on temporary contracts or casual workers would be the first to lose their jobs 
and hence increase the responsiveness of unemployment to output changes. On the other 
hand, flexibility of working hours may lead firms to cut working hours rather than laying off 
workers. Countries that had regulations about severance pay may have had a lower rate of 
retrenchment, and led firms to use short time working, see Gamberoni, Uexkull, and Weber 66 
 
(2011). As a result when the economy recovers, it may lead to a “jobless recovery’ for some 
time. 
Overall, the findings of our research are that there are many differences between the impact 
of the Great Recession on different countries. Countries that faced a significant financial 
crisis and a collapse of the housing market bubble have had large increases in unemployment 
and long term unemployment.  There was a big fall in employment in the (especially) 
construction and manufacturing industries. The financial collapse led to an increase in 
unemployment in the financial and business sector. As a result of these twin shocks labour 
mobility  of the unemployed is likely to be affected: with negative equity in housing, 
unemployed workers are unlikely to move regionally. With a loss of wealth (in housing and 
financial assets, including superannuation) there will be a fall in consumer spending which 
will slow down the recovery of economies. Overall, we find that an increase in 
unemployment rates leads to an increase in the proportion of long term unemployment 
(PLTU) for some time, and there is persistence in PLTU. This means that, especially for 
some countries, there will be a long period of high unemployment and long term 
unemployment.  
 
8.  Implications for Labour Market Policy 
“Active labour market policy can be a complement but not a 
substitute to other measures.” Calmfors (1994, p. 38) 
What this paper has shown is that long term unemployment increases concomitantly with the 
unemployment rate. Hence, policies that lead to a lowering of the unemployment rate, will 
after a lag, lead to a lowering of long term unemployment. In the immediate aftermath of the 
Great Recession most OECD countries introduced crisis measure to stabilise their economies: 
these policies included significant loosening of monetary policy (interest rates by central 
banks being lowered to almost zero) and aggressive fiscal policies (increased public 
expenditure, increased expenditure on active labour market policies, and policies to 
encourage firms to cut hours rather than fire workers). There is evidence from some 
countries, e.g. Australia, where these aggressive policies managed to stave off a recession 
while in other countries the recession was not as deep as it might otherwise have been. 67 
 
Germany is an interesting example where the introduction of cutting working hours appears 
to have helped to prevent an increase in unemployment and long term unemployment. 
However, as the global crisis appears to have eased many OECD governments have become 
concerned about increasing government budget deficits and have introduced (as in the UK) 
major measures to cut back public expenditures. However, as the IMF (2010) says, “Given 
the additional prospect that unemployment becomes structural, the standard macroeconomic 
levers-monetary and fiscal policy-remain the primary tools for boosting employment through 
the impact on economic activity. In countries where unemployment rates remain high and the 
economy is operating below potential, policy stimulus remains warranted.” (Italics added, p. 
70.) 
With this in mind, we need to consider Active Labour Market Policies that are currently in 
use, but with a view to targeting the long term unemployed. This study has shown that there 
was a great diversity of experience of long term unemployment in different OECD countries. 
For example, the age distribution of the increases in long term unemployment was such that 
the US had a very large increase in older people (55 years plus), while in Spain the biggest 
increase was for the younger unemployed (15-24 year olds), and in Canada the biggest 
increases were for the young and the old. By gender, in most OECD countries males 
dominated amongst the long term unemployed and there was an increase of the male 
proportions during the Great Recession. However, in some countries like Canada and Ireland 
the male share of long term unemployed fell.  
The use of short time working was successful in some countries like Germany and Japan in 
containing the growth of unemployment and long term unemployment. However, it is 
probably too late to introduce short time working in other OECD countries as the initial 
exercise was to prevent workers from being laid off. 
The approach to solving or alleviating the problem of unemployment or long term 
unemployment (LTU) has to influence (a) the demand for labour, (b) the supply of 
labour, or (c) the functioning of the labour market. In a pure neoclassical economy, the 
demand for labour is independent of aggregate demand
15
                                                            
15  In a neoclassical model, the labour market always clears. If the Government tries to increase Aggregate 
Demand by using fiscal policy, in the long run the Aggregate Demand Function shifts back to equate with 
Aggregate Supply at full employment equilibrium. 
: it depends simply on firms 
maximising profits subject to a production function with given input and output prices. Of 68 
 
course, if the labour market is not perfectly competitive (which it is not) then policies have 
to influence the way that bargaining takes place in the labour market, affect the information 
flows between the employer and employees etc. An important question that has to be 
answered is to what extent aggregate demand policies can affect the demand for labour. 
Neoclassical economists believe that with competitive markets the only way that 
employment can be affected is by shifting the production function (i.e. via technological 
change). Furthermore, we need to know to what extent technological change affects the 
demand for labour (and the supply of labour). There are some policies that are purely 
"cosmetic": they simply alter the administrative count of unemployment: they simply 
redefine the problem. Early retirement schemes, or schemes that shift older unemployed 
workers from unemployment benefits to old age pensions is one such example.   
Note that what happens to the unemployment rate depends on changes to the participation 
rate.  A growth of the economy would help to expand employment, and lower the 
unemployment rate if the labour force participation rate remains constant. However, we 
expect the participation rate to increase as the economy picks up and decline as the economy 
goes into a recession. Note that the faster the productivity growth, the less labour is required 
and hence employment may not increase rapidly. 
A  set of possible policies to lower the unemployment rate and the rate of long term 
unemployment: 
(a) Indirect job creation via monetary/fiscal policies to increase aggregate demand. Direct job 
creation is where the Government increases employment in the public sector, e.g. education, 
health, etc. 
(b) Active Labour Market Policies (ALMPs). 
Labour market programs /training / subsidies /counselling / direct job creation programs.  
Should we worry if we only "reshuffle the queue"? 
(c) Reforming the labour market:  Deregulation, e.g. changing employment protection 
legislation; Lower non-wage labour costs, e.g. payroll taxes; Work for the Dole. 
(e) Unemployment benefits: Lower them. Decrease duration of benefits.  
(g) Restrict Immigration? 69 
 
(h) Early retirement policies. Work-sharing by short-time working. 
(i) Improve education, training and skills formation. 
What is the aim of ALMPs? An obvious one is to increase employment or decrease 
unemployment. Another one is to increase the efficiency of the operation of the labour 
market by improving the matching of skills between the unemployed and vacancies (improve 
the trade-off between inflation and unemployment, or to "cheat the Phillips curve" or to shift 
the Beveridge U-V curve), i.e. to decrease frictions that may be due to imperfect information. 
Another important objective may be to improve equity. Thus ALMPs may be targeted at 
disadvantaged groups, e.g. the Aboriginal people, migrants, the sick and disabled, sole 
parents, women, the long term unemployed, etc. If the equity issue is taken seriously it means 
that ALMPs need not decrease aggregate unemployment (increase employment) but simply 
redistribute (share) unemployment (employment). ALMPs should certainly be targeted at 
disadvantaged groups, but should also attempt to decrease aggregate unemployment. As 
many of the OECD economies are still just beginning to recover from the Great Recession, 
this is only possible if ALMPs are accompanied by measures to increase aggregate demand 
via fiscal and monetary policy. 
Most evaluations of labour market programs, however, are fraught with difficulties.  
Whether subsidies to employers increase employment and decrease unemployment in 
aggregate depends on several factors: (a) how sensitive employment is to a small change in 
the wage (i.e. the elasticity of demand); (b) the extent to which there is deadweight loss 
(the jobs which would have been created anyway); (c) substitution (the extent to which the 
target group is helped at the expense of the rest of the unemployed); (d) job displacement 
(subsidised employers expanding at the expense of non-subsidised employers); (e) the extent 
to which these programs increase the labour force participation; the so-called registration 
rate effect, and (f) employers attitudes to the qualities of the target groups. If the new 
subsidies being offered are for the employer to hire additional workers and to provide them 
with training, this would provide the employers as a method of screening the long term 
unemployed at lower cost than otherwise. But if there is an excess supply of potential 
workers, who have not been stigmatised by long term unemployment, why should employers 
hire the long term unemployed? 70 
 
The Great Recession has seen a massive increase in unemployment and long term 
unemployment in most OECD countries. Most earlier evaluations of Active Labour Market 
Policy emphasise that the policies have a relatively small impact on unemployment, that it 
differs from country (or group of countries) to country (another group of countries), and that 
they are expensive to carry out. Card et al. (2010) in an interesting meta-analysis find that job 
search assistance programs are relatively successful, that training programs (especially on-
the-job-training) are successful in the medium term, and that public sector employment 
programs are less effective. However, the analysis does not control for the overall level of 
unemployment (or long term unemployment) at the time of the evaluations.  
In an important survey, Imbens and Wooldridge (2009) discuss the significant problems in 
evaluations. An important point made by them is that, in general, all evaluations ignore the 
general equilibrium aspects: “...a labor market program that affects the labor market 
outcomes for one individual potentially has an effect on the labor market outcomes for others. 
In a world with a fixed number of jobs, a training program could only redistribute jobs.” 
(Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009, p. 13, italics added). 
Given that some countries have double digit unemployment rates (and that is not allowing for 
underemployment or hidden unemployment) there are only a limited number of jobs 
available. If we help one unemployed (or long term unemployed) person, it is likely to be at 
the expense of another person. Active labour market policies should have an equity goal, 
besides an efficiency goal. In a situation of high and increasing long term unemployment, if 
ALMPs can simply share the burden of unemployment between different people (groups) and 
do not lead to any net increase in employment (decrease in unemployment) it should be 
accepted as an equity success, not an efficiency failure.  Even a redistribution of 
unemployment over different persons  may have an efficiency bonus if long term 
unemployment leads to a person becoming disengaged permanently from the labour market. 
There is some evidence to suggest that there has been a shift in Okun’s Law equation and in 
the Beveridge Curve, see IMF (2010), OECD (2010a) perhaps due to the labour market 
reforms of the past two decades. 
Given the serious nature of the problem of long term unemployment, we need to use 
macroeconomic policy instruments to stimulate aggregate demand and to introduce active 71 
 
labour market policies
16. Policies to stimulate aggregate demand could be slanted towards 
helping the OECD economies to meet their Kyoto targets of reducing green house gas 
emissions. It is difficult to propose labour market policies that would suit all or most of the 
OECD countries since their experience had been very different. However, in some sense it 
would be socially valuable to concentrate on targeting active labour market policies on the 
young long term unemployed as they should not get disengaged from the labour force. 
Increasing resentment amongst the young long term unemployed is likely to store up serious 
social problems for the future. It would be good if OECD countries introduced a job 
guarantee scheme at least for the young long term unemployed. Given budget constraints it 
would (perhaps) be difficult to introduce a job guarantee scheme for all the long term 
unemployed. Ideally, we should “profile” those people who are likely to become long term 
unemployed (usually the disadvantaged groups in society) and target labour market policies 
towards them before they become long term unemployed. In these circumstances, the only 
policies that can be recommended are the use of increased emphasis on subsidising job 
search and a job guarantee scheme targeted at the long term unemployed (or preferably, 
those who are likely to become long term unemployed)
17
A job guarantee scheme, as was provided in Australia in the 1990s was based on firms being 
subsidised to hire an additional long term unemployed person.  Clearly,  subsidising 
employers should be based on subsidies being paid only if there was an increase in the stock 
of employed persons in that firm, a marginal employment subsidy. 
. 
As we have seen there is a variety of experience faced by different OECD countries. Those 
countries that faced a financial crisis and a housing market collapse will most likely take 
much longer to recover from this crisis.  The increased uncertainty caused by the financial 
crisis in some countries, notably the USA, will likely mean that unemployment and long 
term unemployment will remain high. In addition, the collapse of the housing market will 
slow down mobility from one area to another.  
                                                            
16 Atkinson (2008) argues “Government budgets are under stress, but citizens are going to expect that, if funds 
can be found to rescue banks, then governments can fund unemployment benefits and employment subsidies. 
If governments can take on the role of lender of last resort, then we should be willing to see government as 
the employer of last resort.” 
17 Some economists would argue that we should either cut the generosity of unemployment benefits or the 
duration over which benefits are paid. However, in a crisis situation when jobs are scarce it is unlikely to make 
any difference to unemployment or long term unemployment. In fact, the aggregated demand effects of 
cutting unemployment benefits would likely aggravate the unemployment and long term unemployment 
problems. 72 
 
Those countries that had significant falls in average hours worked are likely to have a slow 
recovery in terms of new jobs as workers will return to normal hours of work. Germany is an 
interesting case where the policy of short time working prevented a large increase in 
unemployment, but its recovery has been rapid due to its expansion of exports. 
Conclusions 
For many countries in the OECD, the Great Recession has led to a significant growth of long 
term unemployment. Countries that faced financial crises accompanied by a housing market 
collapse are likely to face continuing uncertainty that would slow down any economic 
recovery, hence leading to continuing problems with long term unemployment. For some 
OECD countries where they had a big increase in short time working (for example in 
Germany and Japan) economic recovery may be one of a job-less recovery as employer 
increase working hours for existing workers and hence delaying the fall in unemployment 
and long term unemployment. This paper has shown that long term unemployment is a 
serious problem in most OECD countries and that,  in general,  it follows the growth of 
unemployment with a lag. The experience of long term unemployment has serious social and 
economic consequences and policies should be introduced to help the long term unemployed. 
As argued earlier, we need to combine aggregate demand expansion measures along with 
active labour market policies. 
Overall, the findings of our research are that there are many differences between the impact 
of the Great Recession on different countries. Countries that faced a significant financial 
crisis and a collapse of the housing market bubble have had large increases in unemployment 
and long term unemployment. There was a big fall in employment in the (especially) 
construction and manufacturing industries. The financial collapse led to an increase in 
unemployment in the financial and business sector. As a result of these twin shocks labour 
mobility of the unemployed is likely to be affected: with negative equity in housing, 
unemployed workers are unlikely to move regionally. With a loss of wealth (in housing and 
financial assets, including superannuation) there will be a fall in consumer spending which 
will slow down the recovery of economies. This means that, especially for some countries, 
there will be a long period of high unemployment and long term unemployment.  
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There are still many uncertainties about the tentative recoveries in some countries: the UK 
which had a small increase in GDP in the third quarter had a fall in the fourth quarter of 2010. 
Countries like Portugal, Spain and Italy are still facing significant problems and it is still too 
early to see the end of the crisis of long term unemployment. 
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Appendix 
Figure A1: Annual Percentage Change in Unemployment Rates, G7 (less DEU) 
 
 
Figure A2: Percentage Change in PLTU, G7 
 
The above graphs for the annual percentage changes in unemployment rates and in PLTU for 
the G7. The movements in the series are remarkably similar! 80 
 







CAN   3.3  12.4 
FRA   2.7  31.9 
DEU   1.2  9.8 
ITA   3.2  97.8 
JPN   1.5  62.6 
GBR   6.2  53.1 
US   2.1  8.4 
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Appendix Table 11 Pooled and Fixed Effects Regressions on Quarterly Data 
(Males) 
                     (1)             (2)    
                     pltu (Pooled)       pltu (FE)    
-------------------------------------------- 
l1ur                0.443           0.143    
                   (1.11)          (0.38)    
 
l2ur               -0.151          -0.372    
                  (-0.24)         (-0.62)    
 
l3ur                1.095*          1.049*   
                   (1.71)          (1.74)    
 
l4ur               -1.285***     -0.00782    
                  (-3.19)         (-0.02)    
 
l1pltu              0.691***        0.555*** 
                  (20.87)         (17.00)    
 
l2pltu           -0.00476         -0.0528    
                  (-0.12)         (-1.39)    
 
l3pltu              0.181***        0.151*** 
                   (4.50)          (3.97)    
 
l4pltu              0.112***        0.108*** 
                   (3.43)          (3.45)    
 
q2                  1.473***        1.323*** 
                   (4.93)          (4.71)    
 
q3                  0.767**         0.712**  
                   (2.56)          (2.53)    
 
q4                  1.001***        1.006*** 
                   (3.27)          (3.50)    
 
gfc                -0.893          -1.884*** 
                  (-1.33)         (-2.83)    
 
gfcl1ur            -2.073***       -1.730*** 
                  (-3.39)         (-2.98)    
 
gfcl2ur             2.855***        2.538*** 
                   (2.77)          (2.62)    
 
gfcl3ur             0.491          -0.203    
                   (0.45)         (-0.20)    
 
gfcl4ur            -0.996          -0.101    
                  (-1.45)         (-0.16)    
 
gfcl1pltu          0.0361        -0.00946    
                   (0.61)         (-0.17)    
 
gfcl2pltu           0.198***        0.179*** 
                   (2.76)          (2.64)    
 
gfcl3pltu          -0.235***       -0.222*** 
                  (-3.35)         (-3.37)    
 
gfcl4pltu         -0.0371       -0.000262    
                  (-0.65)         (-0.00)    
 
_cons              -0.824**         0.728    
                  (-2.27)          (1.15)    
N                    1342            1342   82 
 
Equation 1 (Pooled) 
R-squared     =  0.9496 
Adj R-squared =  0.9488 
Tests for Structural Break:  
F(  9,  1321) =    6.81 
            Prob > F =    0.0000 
 
Equation 2 (Fixed Effects) 
R-sq:  within  = 0.7565 
between = 0.9632 
overall = 0.9245 
Tests for Structural Break:  
F(  9,  1292) =    7.29 
            Prob > F =    0.0000 
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Appendix: Estimates of Outflow Rates 
 
A further analysis we carried out was to calculate outflow rates from data on unemployment 
stocks as follows: 
Ut = Ut-1 + It – Xt  
or 
Xt = Ut-1 - Ut + It 
Where exits, Xt are derived by using the identity that the stock of unemployment at time t, 
equals the stock at time (t-1), plus the inflows into the unemployment stock minus the 
outflows (exits) from the unemployment stock. Unfortunately, we do not have data on 
inflows so we use an approximation. We assume that all those in the unemployment duration 
of one month (or less) are the inflows into the unemployment stock. However, this is an 
approximation, since many of the inflows into the unemployment stock outflow very rapidly 
and hence this is likely to be an underestimate of the true inflows. However, it provides us 
with a simple series on the outflows. The outflow rate is then calculated as the outflows 
(exits) divided by the unemployment stock. This calculated outflow rate series is a fairly 
noisy series and confusing if different country series were presented on one graph. As such 
the series are presented below for some of the OECD countries. 
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Figure 18 a: USA Outflow Rate 
 
Source: U Flows, derived from OECD duration by age and gender. 
Figure 18 b: UK Outflow Rate 
 
Source: U Flows, derived from OECD duration by age and gender. 
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Figure 18 c: Spain Outflow Rate 
 
Source: U Flows, derived from OECD duration by age and gender. 
 
The calculated series for the outflow rates show clearly that the outflow rates fall suddenly in 
recessions, especially in the Great Recession. However, the estimated or calculated series are 
very crude and clearly have some problems as these series become negative (which is clearly 
infeasible!). Shimer (2007) has argued that the increase in US unemployment is primarily due 
to a fall in outflows from unemployment. OECD (2009, p. 52) also argue that the outflow 
rates are primarily responsible in explaining fluctuations in unemployment. Elsby, Hobijn, 
and Ahin (2010) find that in the Great Recession the increases in unemployment and long 
term unemployment were initially caused by an increase of inflows into unemployment (job 
loss), but there was a large decrease in the outflow rate causing the huge increases in long 
term unemployment. They also argue that an improvement in the unemployment rate would 
require an increase in the exit probabilities (outflow rate). 
Over the past decade many countries increased labour market flexibility with an increasing 
number of workers on temporary contracts and flexibility to alter working hours, see IMF 
(2010). Those on temporary contracts or casual workers would be the first to lose their jobs 
and hence increase the responsiveness of unemployment to output changes. On the other 
hand, flexibility of working hours may lead firms to cut working hours rather than laying off 86 
 
workers. Countries that had regulations about severance pay may have had a lower rate of 
retrenchment, and led firms to use short time working, see Gamberoni, Uexkull, and Weber 
(2011). As a result when the economy recovers, it may lead to a “jobless recovery’ for some 
time. 
 
 